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ABSTRACT	Over	the	past	15	years,	the	political	and	economic	relationship	between	China	and	Latin	America	has	progressed	rapidly.		Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America	has	risen	to	unprecedented	levels,	and	numerous	Latin	American	leaders	have	praised	and	welcomed	China’s	growing	influence	in	the	region.	A	key	component	of	this	burgeoning	relationship	has	been	the	emergence	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	between	China	and	Latin	American	nations.	Over	the	past	30	years,	China	has	signed	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	12	different	Latin	American	countries.	In	light	of	their	increasing	importance,	this	paper	seeks	to	analyze	the	role	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	in	the	Sino-Latin	America	relationship.	Through	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis,	this	paper	examines	what	factors	motivate	China	and	Latin	American	countries	to	sign	bilateral	investment	treaties	and	also	analyzes	whether	these	agreements	are	useful	tools	for	encouraging	investment.	The	quantitative	section	of	this	paper	establishes	that	factors	traditionally	recognized	as	motivations	for	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America	do	not	have	a	significant	effect	on	signing	a	bilateral	trade	agreement.	The	qualitative	section	addresses	and	further	examines	this	surprising	finding,	both	by	comparing	Chinese	investment	in	two	different	countries	and	analyzing	the	treaties	themselves.	Overall,	the	paper	finds	that	normal	motivations	for	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America	do	not	apply	to	the	signing	of	bilateral	investment	treaties.	Furthermore,	the	findings	challenge	the	prevailing	assumption	that	bilateral	treaties	stimulate	foreign	direct	investment,	at	least	in	the	context	of	the	Sino-Latin	American	relationship.	
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	 CHAPTER	1:	INTRODUCTION		 In	2008,	the	Colombian	national	newspaper	El	Espectador	ran	an	article	announcing	the	signing	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	between	Colombia	and	China.	In	the	piece,	Colombia’s	then-Minister	of	Commerce	Luis	Guillermo	Plata	touts	the	agreement,	declaring	that,	“For	Colombia,	this	agreement	is	of	particular	importance,	as	it	will	protect	China’s	investment	in	(our)	country…(and)	increase	the	confidence	of	Asian	investors”	(“Colombia	y	China”	1).	While	on	the	surface	Plata’s	declaration	sounds	like	standard	political	rhetoric,	its	significance	lies	in	its	candor.		In	the	21st	century,	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America	is	absolutely	of	“particular	importance,”	and	more	and	more	effort	is	being	made	by	Latin	American	governments	to	ensure	“the	confidence	of	Chinese	investors.”			 China’s	newfound	influence	in	Latin	America	embodies	the	dramatic	change	that	China	has	undergone	since	its	1978	Open	Door	Policy	released	its	borders	to	foreign	trade	and	investment.	Since	that	declaration,	Chinese	foreign	investment	and	engagement	has	expanded	at	a	breathtaking	rate.	In	less	than	40	years,	China	has	transformed	from	a	protectionist	nation	wary	of	foreign	influence	into	one	of	the	world’s	foremost	economic	and	political	actors.	China’s	expanding	global	influence	is	particularly	striking	in	Latin	America.	In	a	region	historically	dominated	by	American	control	and	influence,	the	Chinese	have	made	profound	economic	and	political	inroads.		
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	 One	of	the	most	significant	codifications	of	China’s	expanding	influence	in	Latin	America	has	been	the	rise	of	bilateral	investment	treaties.	Since	1992,	China	has	signed	12	different	bilateral	investment	treaties	with	various	Latin	American	countries	(United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development).	In	theory,	these	treaties	serve	as	physical	representations	of	China	and	Latin	America’s	mutual	commitment	to	trade	and	investment.	As	one	article	from	the	Georgetown	Journal	of	
International	Law	explains,	“Countries	sign	BITs	to	promote	foreign	investment	with	their	treaty	partners…for	developing	country	governments,	BITs	are	a	way	to	reassure	investors	and	thereby	attract	more	investment	by	making	a	credible	commitment	to	protect	property	rights”	(Hadley	260).	Furthermore,	some	empirical	research	suggests	bilateral	investment	treaties	have	a	significant	effect	on	investment.			 This	paper	seeks	to	answer	two	questions	related	to	the	importance	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	in	the	China-Latin	America	relationship.	First,	it	will	investigate	which	factors	motivate	China	to	pursue	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	a	Latin	American	nation.	Intriguingly,	the	quantitative	and	qualitative	analysis	in	the	paper	suggests	that	some	of	the	most-commonly	cited	motivations	for	signing	bilateral	investment	treaties	may	not	apply	to	the	China-Latin	America	relationship.	A	thorough	review	of	scholarly	literature	reveals	two	competing	hypotheses	as	to	what	motivates	China	to	invest	in	Latin	American	countries.	The	first	hypothesis	theorizes	that	China	is	targeting	Latin	American	countries	rich	in	natural	resources	in	an	effort	to	extract	primary	goods	to	fuel	its	industrial	economy.	The	second	theory	posits	that	China	is	using	foreign	direct	investment	as	a	tool	to	align	with	left-
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wing	governments	in	Latin	America	and	spread	its	global	political	influence.		Of	course,	these	two	motivations	are	not	wholly	exclusive	of	one	another.	Many	of	the	most	resource-rich	countries	in	Latin	America	are	led	by	powerful	left-wing	governments.	If	it	is	true	that	these	are	China’s	primary	motivations,	then	it	is	likely	that	China	would	target	these	countries.	Thus,	this	paper	will	use	quantitative	analysis	to	assess	the	impact	of	each	of	these	motivations	on	the	signing	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	in	an	attempt	to	determine	what	factors	make	China-Latin	America	bilateral	investment	treaties	more	likely.		 The	second	question	this	paper	seeks	to	address	is	more	fundamental:	are	bilateral	investment	treaties	important	tools	for	Chinese	investment	and	influence	in	Latin	America?	Many	scholars	assume	that	bilateral	investment	treaties	are	indicators	of	mutual	commitment	to	greater	economic	cooperation;	however,	the	quantitative	analysis	in	this	paper	suggests	that	bilateral	investment	treaties	between	China	and	Latin	America	have	not	been	correlated	with	greater	levels	of	economic	investment.	In	fact,	several	of	China’s	top	trade	and	investment	partners,	such	as	Venezuela	and	Brazil,	do	not	have	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	This	paper	will	investigate	this	apparent	discrepancy	through	case	studies	that	compare	various	Latin	American	countries	and	analyze	the	terms	of	the	bilateral	investment	treaties.		 The	meteoric	rise	of	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America	over	the	past	two	decades	has	imbued	the	questions	addressed	in	this	paper	with	mounting	importance.		As	China	begins	to	challenge	U.S.	economic	and	political	hegemony	in	Latin	America,	it	is	vital	to	understand	China’s	motivations	and	methods	for	
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investment	in	the	region.	The	increasing	importance	of	the	relationship	has	produced	new	questions	for	scholars.	Are	bilateral	investment	treaties	indicative	of	greater	economic	investment?	If	they	are,	what	factors	make	China	and	Latin	American	countries	more	likely	to	sign	them?	If	they	are	not,	what	other	methods	are	being	used	to	encourage	greater	economic	cooperation?	Essentially,	this	paper	seeks	to	contribute	to	a	greater	understanding	of	the	China-Latin	America	economic	relationship,	a	relationship	of	rapidly	growing	importance	to	the	world.	
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		CHAPTER	2:	LITERATURE	REVIEW	
The	Importance	of	Bilateral	Investment	Treaties	
	 Bilateral	investment	treaties	are	the	subject	of	this	paper.	In	the	quantitative	section,	the	signing	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	is	used	as	a	dependent	variable	that	is	expected	to	indicate	and	correspond	with	greater	levels	of	foreign	direct	investment.	In	the	qualitative	section,	bilateral	investment	treaties	are	critically	analyzed	to	gain	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	Sino-Latin	America	economic	relationship.	Thus,	in	order	for	both	of	these	analyses	to	have	validity,	it	is	vital	to	clearly	establish	the	importance	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	both	internationally	and	within	the	context	of	the	Sino-Latin	America	relationship.			 Perhaps	the	greatest	evidence	for	the	significance	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	is	their	sheer	abundance.	According	to	the	United	Nations	Conference	for	Trade	and	Development,	there	are	2946	bilateral	investment	treaties	throughout	the	world,	involving	nearly	every	country.	Furthermore,	bilateral	investment	treaties	continue	to	be	by	far	the	most	common	methods	for	generating	foreign	direct	investment,	as	multilateral	treaties	remain	rare.	As	international	law	expert	Dr.	Tarcisio	Gazzini	explains,	“There	exists	no	multilateral	treaty	on	foreign	investment	comparable	in	terms	of	participation	to	multilateral	trade	agreements…	As	a	matter	of	treaty	law,	therefore,	foreign	investments	are	currently	protected	by	a	complex	web	of	bilateral	investment	treaties”	(Gazzini	2).	The	pervasiveness	of	these	treaties	bears	witness	to	their	important	global	role.	
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	 There	are	a	number	of	reasons	why	bilateral	investment	treaties	have	become	so	prominent	in	the	international	community.	Most	obviously,	bilateral	investment	treaties	offer	a	number	of	advantages	relative	to	other	options.	Specifically,	bilateral	investment	treaties	tend	to	be	rather	flexible	and	open	to	amendment.	As	Gazzini	notes,	“The	flexibility	of	the	bilateral	framework	permits	states	to	tailor	their	commitments	in	accordance	with	specific	needs…(and)	the	bilateral	nature	of	these	treaties	facilitates	their	modification”	(Gazzini	6).	In	other	words,	these	treaties	can	be	made	to	order.		 These	inherent	advantages	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	relative	to	multilateral	investment	treaties	explain	bilateral	investment	treaties’	continued	significance.	However,	an	even	more	compelling	reason	for	the	profusion	and	proliferation	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	is	competition.	An	investigation	co-authored	by	researchers	Zachary	Elkins,	Andrew	Guzman,	and	Beth	Simmons	in	2008	found	that	“the	diffusion	of	BITs	is	associated	with	competitive	economic	pressures	among	developing	countries	to	capture	a	share	of	foreign	investment”	(Elkins	et	al.	265).	Put	simply,	competition	breeds	growth.	Countries	have	shown	a	greater	eagerness	to	sign	bilateral	investment	treaties	after	seeing	competitor	countries	sign	the	same	agreements.	This	has	led	to	the	diffusion	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	worldwide.		 This	diffusion	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	has	spread	to	China	and	Latin	America.	Latin	America	as	a	whole	has	more	than	380	bilateral	investment	treaties,	and	ten	separate	Latin	American	countries	possess	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	Additionally,	almost	all	of	these	treaties	have	been	signed	within	the	
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past	25	years,	suggesting	an	increasing	interest	in	investment	between	China	and	Latin	America.	Some	experts	have	claimed	that	the	propagation	of	these	treaties	in	Latin	America	is	due	to	the	favorable	terms	of	China’s	loans	in	comparison	to	those	of	its	traditional	Western	investor	counterparts	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	International	Monetary	Fund.	However,	analysis	on	this	subject	has	been	mixed,	with	some	studies	suggesting	that	Chinese	banks	actually	impose	stricter	terms	than	the	World	Bank	(Gallagher	et	al.).	Thus,	the	motivation	for	the	increase	in	both	bilateral	investment	treaties	and	actual	foreign	direct	investment	dollars	between	China	and	Latin	America	remains	unclear.		 One	difficulty	in	determining	China’s	motivations	for	investment	in	Latin	America	is	the	relative	scarcity	and	unreliability	of	current	foreign	direct	investment	data.	Because	of	this,	scholars	have	struggled	to	conduct	empirical	analyses	that	could	directly	link	variables	like	political	leaning	or	natural	resource	wealth	with	increased	investment.	In	light	of	this,	this	paper	assumes	bilateral	investment	treaties	as	a	signifier	of	China	and	Latin	American	countries’	mutual	commitment	towards	investment.	This	assertion	is	backed	by	quantitative	analysis.	A	2005	empirical	study	by	economists	Eric	Neumayer	and	Laura	Spess	concluded,	“Developing	countries	that	sign	more	BITs	with	developed	countries	receive	more	FDI	inflows”	(Neumayer	&	Spess	27).	Subsequent	studies	have	been	mixed,	but	have,	for	the	most	part,	reinforced	the	notion	that	bilateral	investment	treaties	promote	FDI.	However,	as	of	yet,	no	scholars	have	investigated	this	correlation	in	the	specific	context	of	the	China-Latin	America	relationship.	This	paper	seeks	to	fill	that	void.			
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The	Sino-Latin	America	Economic	Relationship		 Since	2000,	trade	between	China	and	Latin	America	has	increased	by	2,000%,	and	China	has	become	the	world’s	third-largest	provider	of	foreign	direct	investment	(Peters	1).		Furthermore,	over	the	past	five	years,	China	has	invested	over	$10	billion	annually	in	Latin	America,	and	has	also	pledged	to	directly	invest	more	than	$750	billion	over	the	next	decade	(Dollar	1).		As	a	result,	China	has	established	itself	as	an	influential	economic	presence	in	Latin	America,	serving	as	the	top	trade	partner	and	investor	to	a	number	of	Latin	American	countries	such	as	Brazil,	Peru,	and	Venezuela	(Coyer	1).			 Perhaps	most	significantly,	it	has	begun	to	challenge	the	United	States’	economic	hegemony	in	parts	of	the	region.	Its	level	of	foreign	direct	investment	is	now	second	only	to	the	United	States,	and	President	Xi	Jinping	has	made	multiple	tours	of	Latin	America,	often	touting	China’s	ambitious	One	Belt	One	Road	investment	initiative.	The	rhetoric	has	had	an	impact.	Following	one	recent	speech,	Chilean	Foreign	Minister	Heraldo	Munoz	said	this:	“China	said	something	that	is	very	important,	that	it	wants	to	be	our	most	trustworthy	partner	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	and	we	greatly	value	that”	(Cambero	&	Sherwood).		 Yet,	while	China’s	investment	and	influence	in	Latin	America	have	both	grown	dramatically	over	the	last	two	decades,	the	most	recent	data	indicates	that	the	trade	boom	may	be	ebbing.	In	2016,	exports	from	Latin	America	to	China	remained	stagnant	for	the	third	year	in	a	row.	Moreover,	Latin	American	imports	from	China	actually	fell	by	14%,	the	first	significant	dip	in	over	a	decade.	Though	this	slump	could	simply	be	attributed	to	the	region’s	overall	economic	recession	(a	
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.8%	GDP	drop	in	2016),	it	is	a	reminder	that	China’s	economic	presence	in	the	region	remains	secondary	to	that	of	the	United	States	(Ray	&	Gallagher	2).	
The	Natural	Resource	Extraction	Theory	
		 Despite	this	slight	downturn,	Chinese	investment	continued	to	surge	in	one	key	area:	extractive	industries.	In	2016,	China	purchased	a	record	22%	of	Latin	America’s	extractive	exports,	and	more	than	half	of	its	public	sector	lending	to	Latin	America	was	concentrated	in	extractive	industries	(Ray	&	Gallagher	3).	This	data	aligns	with	a	trend	scholars	have	been	highlighting	for	years	in	the	Sino-Latin	America	economic	relationship,	namely	that	China	appears	to	target	resource-rich	Latin	American	countries	as	recipients	for	foreign	direct	investment	with	the	goal	of	using	these	resources	to	fuel	its	developing	economy.		 In	2015,	the	Global	Economic	Initiative	at	Boston	University	published	a	report	on	Sino-Latin	American	trade	relations	revealing	that	“Latin	American	exports	to	China,	as	well	as	Chinese	investment	in	the	region,	have	been…concentrated	in	primary	commodities”	(Ray	et	al.	2).	This	focus	on	primary	goods	has	led	many	to	posit	that	China’s	burgeoning	economic	involvement	in	the	region	is	motivated	by	a	desire	to	exploit	Latin	America’s	natural	resource	wealth.	A	separate	report	from	the	International	Monetary	Fund	notes,	“Foreign	direct	investment	from	China…is	heavily	oriented	toward	the	expansion	of	natural	resource	exploitation	in	Latin	America”	(Elson).	These	assertions	are	backed	up	by	data.	Over	the	last	decade	China	has	more	than	tripled	its	share	of	Latin	American	extractive	exports	and	doubled	its	share	of	Latin	American	agricultural	exports	(Ray	et	al.	4).	Recently,	China	has	even	openly	acknowledged	that	natural	resources	are	a	
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key	component	of	the	Sino-Latin	American	economic	relationship.	In	its	2016	official	policy	paper	on	Latin	America,	China	highlighted	“energy	and	resources	cooperation”	as	one	of	its	top	policy	priorities	(Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs).		 A	few	of	the	natural	resources	being	pursued	by	China	are	sufficiently	important	to	merit	their	own	discussion,	namely	oil	and	minerals.	The	United	States	Department	of	Energy	recently	reported	that	China	surpassed	the	U.S.	as	the	world’s	top	oil	importer	in	2017.	China	now	imports	approximately	7.4	billion	barrels	of	oil	a	day.	In	2007,	that	number	was	3.2	million	barrels,	meaning	that	China	has	more	than	doubled	its	oil	imports	in	the	past	decade	(Johnson).	A	host	of	factors,	including	China’s	swiftly	industrializing	economy	and	increasingly	oil-reliant	populace,	have	contributed	to	its	greater	appetite	for	oil.	In	Latin	America,	China	has	found	a	number	of	eager	oil	exporters,	including	Venezuela,	Brazil,	and	Mexico.			 Besides	oil,	minerals	have	been	the	other	primary	target	for	Chinese	extraction.	China’s	desire	for	rare	earth	minerals	has	been	well	documented	in	scholarly	literature,	particularly	in	the	case	of	Africa.	While	Latin	America	has	received	less	attention,	minerals	quietly	accounted	for	more	than	35%	of	its	exports	to	China	from	2011-2015	(Ray	&	Gallagher	7).	Additionally,	China	has	funded	numerous	mining	projects	in	various	Latin	American	countries	aimed	specifically	at	copper	and	steel	extraction.	In	2014,	Peru	received	funding	for	four	major	mining	projects	worth	more	than	$13	billion	(Avendano	et	al.	8).	Evidently,	China	has	an	interest	in	accumulating	minerals,	and	Latin	America’s	relative	abundance	of	minerals	makes	it	a	prime	target.			
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The	Left-Wing	Political	Alignment	Theory	
		 Though	it	seems	clear	that	China	is	eager	to	import	Latin	American	natural	resources,	resource	accumulation	may	not	be	the	sole	reason	for	increased	Chinese	engagement	in	the	region.	In	fact,	several	scholars	have	proposed	an	alternative	hypothesis,	relating	specifically	to	China’s	political	alignments	with	several	far	left-wing	Latin	American	governments.	In	their	book	Latin	America	Facing	China,	political	scientists	Alex	Fernandez	Jilberto	and	Barbara	Hogenboom	postulate	that	a	convergence	in	political	ideology	between	China	and	several	Latin	American	countries	has	driven	increased	trade.	They	note,	“Both	the	Beijing	Consensus	and	Latin	America’s	new	Left	consider	the	participation	of	the	state	crucial	in	making	the	globalization	and	liberalization	of	the	economy	a	sustained	success”	(Jilberto	&	Hogenboom	xiii).	Other	sources	echo	these	claims,	with	one	Economist	article	describing	China	as	an	“anti-imperialist	sugar	daddy”	to	left-wing	Latin	American	governments	(“A	Golden	Opportunity”	1).			 One	crucial	piece	of	evidence	for	China’s	underlying	political	motivations	in	Latin	America	comes	from	David	Dollar,	a	senior	fellow	at	the	Brookings	Institution.	In	2017,	Dollar	investigated	the	impact	of	quality	of	governance	on	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America.	Traditionally,	scholars	have	found	that	countries	with	high-quality	governance	are	more	likely	to	be	destinations	for	foreign	direct	investment	and	trade,	as	their	good	governance	lends	stability	and	a	greater	likelihood	for	return	on	investment.			 However	Dollar’s	research	indicates	that	China	shows	no	such	preference	for	countries	with	good	governance.	In	fact,	the	data	exhibits	a	slight	bias	towards	
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countries	with	poor	governance.	Some	of	China’s	top	investment	targets,	such	as	Venezuela,	Ecuador,	and	Argentina,	are	rated	poorly	for	their	quality	of	governance.	Dollar’s	finding	lends	credence	to	the	idea	that	China’s	motivations	for	investment	in	Latin	America	may	not	be	purely	economic.	If	China	is	willing	to	risk	investing	in	volatile	states,	where	return	on	investment	is	far	from	assured,	it	would	certainly	appear	that	political	incentives	play	a	key	role	in	its	decision-making	calculus.			 	With	the	diversity	of	scholarly	opinion	surrounding	China’s	investment	incentives,	an	empirical	question	emerges:	how	do	the	two	principal	theorized	motivations	for	Chinese	investment	influence	the	likelihood	of	China	signing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty?	Is	China	more	likely	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	a	left-wing	government	or	a	nation	rich	in	natural	resources?	Does	the	combination	of	those	two	characteristics	all	but	ensure	a	bilateral	investment	treaty?	The	quantitative	data	analysis	below	seeks	to	provide	answers	to	these	questions.	
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	 CHAPTER	3:	HYPOTHESES	In	light	of	the	findings	above,	I	have	formulated	two	hypotheses	regarding	China’s	likelihood	of	signing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	a	Latin	American	country.		First,	all	else	being	equal,	I	would	expect	Latin	American	countries	with	a	greater	wealth	of	natural	resources	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.		Scholars	have	repeatedly	postulated	that	China	is	focused	on	using	its	investment	to	extract	natural	resources	to	feed	its	industrializing	economy,	and	there	have	been	numerous	Chinese	investment	projects	identified	by	scholars	that	focus	on	natural	resource	extraction.		Second,	all	else	being	equal,	I	would	expect	Latin	American	countries	with	left-leaning	governments	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.		These	governments	hold	a	natural	ideological	alignment	with	China,	and	China	may	be	seeking	to	spread	its	global	political	influence.		My	third	and	final	hypothesis	deals	with	the	role	played	by	the	United	States	in	the	formulation	of	Sino-Latin	America	investment	treaties.	I	predict	that,	all	else	being	equal,	countries	that	already	hold	bilateral	investment	treaties	with	the	United	States	will	be	less	likely	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	Traditionally,	the	United	States	has	held	a	hegemonic	role	in	Latin	America,	and	a	number	of	countries	in	Latin	America	rely	on	the	United	States	for	foreign	aid	and	investment.	Countries	already	aligned	with	the	United	States	through	bilateral	trade	agreements	may	view	signing	an	agreement	with	China	as	unnecessary	or	potentially	even	harmful	to	their	agreement	with	the	United	States.	
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Although	each	one	of	these	hypotheses	is	distinct,	together	they	can	be	viewed	as	one	broader	theoretical	postulate.		That	is,	China	is	very	specific	and	deliberate	in	targeting	Latin	American	countries	for	trade	and	investment.		Furthermore,	I	am	postulating	that	the	signing	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	signals	a	commitment	toward	greater	levels	of	trade	and	investment.	This	postulation	is	due	to	the	evidence	presented	in	my	literature	review	that	demonstrates	China’s	motivations	for	investment	as	well	as	the	importance	of	bilateral	investment	treaties.			Thus,	since	resource-rich	countries	with	left-wing	governments	should	be	attractive	targets	for	Chinese	investment,	they	should	sign	bilateral	investment	treaties	with	China	more	quickly.	
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		CHAPTER	4:	METHODOLOGY	This	paper	takes	a	mixed-methods	approach	toward	investigating	what	factors	make	China	more	likely	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	a	Latin	American	country.	It	begins	by	using	a	quantitative	analysis	known	as	the	Cox	proportional	hazards	regression	to	determine	which	factors	may	be	significant	in	impacting	when	China	signs	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	a	Latin	American	country.	Then,	to	augment	the	statistical	analysis,	the	qualitative	section	of	this	paper	encompasses	a	number	of	illustrative	case	studies	that	compare	and	contrast	various	Latin	American	countries’	relationships	with	China	in	an	effort	to	ascertain	the	importance	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	as	a	tool	for	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America.		By	combining	quantitative	and	qualitative	methods	of	analysis,	this	paper	attempts	to	gain	greater	depth	and	understanding	by	comparing	and	contrasting	the	results	of	both	methods,	while	also	offsetting	the	weaknesses	of	each	approach.	As	will	be	seen,	the	quantitative	portion	of	this	paper	yields	rather	surprising	results,	and	thus	the	qualitative	phase	is	useful	for	explaining	these	results	and	filling	in	gaps	in	understanding.		
Method	of	Quantitative	Analysis	The	Cox	proportional	hazards	regression	is	useful	for	studying	the	effect	of	multiple	variables	on	the	amount	of	time	it	takes	for	an	event	to	occur.	In	this	case,	the	event	is	the	signing	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	between	China	and	a	Latin	
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American	nation,	while	the	independent	variables	represent	the	hypotheses	for	increased	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America.	Essentially,	this	model	attempts	to	identify	which	factors	may	cause	China	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	more	quickly.		Interestingly,	the	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	model	is	often	used	in	medical	research	to	investigate	the	survival	times	of	patients	by	examining	multiple	predictor	variables.	Of	course,	it	is	also	often	used	in	the	political	science	realm.	In	the	context	of	this	paper,	it	is	useful	due	to	its	ability	to	analyze	the	effect	of	several	different	factors	simultaneously.	The	model	will	evaluate	the	effect	of	each	of	the	independent	variables	and	determine	if	this	effect	is	statistically	significant.		In	order	for	the	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	model	to	effectively	measure	the	impact	of	the	various	independent	variables,	a	key	assumption	is	that	the	hazards	(in	this	case	the	signing	of	bilateral	investment	treaties)	are	proportional.	Hazard	proportionality	essentially	means	that	the	effect	of	a	given	independent	variable	does	not	change	over	time.	Thus,	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	Cox	model	was	appropriate	for	this	examination,	this	paper	utilized	a	procedure	known	as	the	Schoenfeld	Residuals	Test	to	check	this	assumption.	The	quantitative	results	of	this	analysis	can	be	found	in	the	appendix.	The	Schoenfeld	Test	found	that	proportionality	was	upheld,	and	thus	the	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	model	was	an	appropriate	method	of	analysis.	Another	method	for	testing	the	rate	at	which	the	bilateral	investment	treaties	were	signed	between	China	and	the	Latin	American	countries	is	the	Kaplan-Meier	Survival	Estimate.	This	descriptive	method	graphs	the	percentage	of	Latin	American	countries	in	the	analysis	that	have	signed	a	bilateral	
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investment	treaty	with	China	over	time.	A	copy	of	this	graph	has	also	been	included	in	the	appendix.	The	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	model	utilized	in	this	paper	analyzed	262	data	observations	across	12	countries.	These	262	observations	represent	each	year	in	which	it	was	possible	for	a	Latin	American	country	to	have	signed	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	There	were	12	spells	(the	time	period	during	which	an	event	can	occur).	In	this	case,	the	spells	represent	the	time	period	during	which	each	Latin	American	country	could	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	Finally,	there	were	9	events.	These	9	events	represent	the	9	times	that	a	Latin	American	country	did	in	fact	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	As	a	final	note,	the	quantitative	portion	of	this	paper	utilizes	data	from	a	variety	of	sources,	including	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development,	the	work	of	Andy	Baker	at	the	University	of	Colorado,	and	the	World	Bank.		
Dependent	Variable	The	dependent	variable	in	this	study	will	be	the	time	elapsed	from	China’s	economic	opening	in	1978	until	it	signs	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	a	Latin	American	nation.	This	is	determined	using	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	Data	and	includes	data	from	12	Latin	American	countries.	Time	was	chosen	as	the	dependent	variable	in	this	study	because	it	allows	for	comparison	between	the	different	Latin	American	countries.	Theoretically,	countries	with	certain	characteristics	(i.e.	high	levels	of	natural	resources	and	far	left-wing	governments)	will	be	more	eager	to	sign	bilateral	investment	treaties	with	China	
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and	thus	sign	the	treaties	more	quickly.	The	Cox	Proportional	Hazard	model	tests	this	theory.	
Independent	Variables	The	study	will	include	a	number	of	independent	variables.	The	first	independent	variable	is	the	natural	resource	wealth	of	the	Latin	American	countries.	This	is	a	ratio	level	variable	that	is	determined	using	data	from	the	World	Bank.	It	measures	a	country’s	total	natural	resource	rents	as	a	percentage	of	its	GDP.		 	Related	to	the	natural	resource	wealth	variable	are	two	variables	that	test	for	resources	that	previous	scholarly	literature	has	identified	as	uniquely	important.	The	first	of	these	is	whether	or	not	the	Latin	American	country	is	a	major	oil	producer.	This	is	a	dummy	variable	in	which	Brazil,	Mexico,	and	Venezuela	are	labeled	as	oil	producers	(due	to	their	collective	output	of	75%	of	the	region’s	oil).	The	second	of	these	two	specific	natural	resources	variables	measures	whether	or	not	the	Latin	American	country	is	a	major	mineral	producer.	This	is	also	a	dummy	variable	in	which	Bolivia,	Chile,	and	Peru	are	labeled	as	mineral	producers	(due	to	being	the	top	three	exporters	of	minerals	according	to	World	Bank	data).	The	fourth	independent	variable	in	this	study	is	the	political	identity	of	the	Latin	American	countries.	Countries	are	labeled	“left-leaning”	or	“right-leaning”	depending	on	the	political	affiliations	of	their	governments.	This	is	a	categorical	variable	that	is	determined	through	research	by	Andy	Baker,	a	political	scientist	at	the	University	of	Colorado.	Baker’s	research	assigns	Latin	American	political	candidates	ideological	scores	on	a	scale	of	1-20	(1	being	ultra-left	and	20	being	ultra-right)	by	analyzing	the	candidates’	voting	behavior.		
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The	final	independent	variable	in	this	study	is	whether	or	not	the	Latin	American	country	holds	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	the	United	States.	This	dummy	variable	seeks	to	assess	whether	or	not	states	holding	investment	treaties	may	be	dissuaded	from	signing	investment	treaties	with	China.	The	data	is	taken	from	the	United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development	Data.	By	using	all	of	these	independent	variables,	this	quantitative	study	seeks	to	explore	the	relevant	factors	that	contribute	to	the	signing	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	between	China	and	Latin	American	countries.	
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		CHAPTER	5:	QUANTITATIVE	DATA	ANALYSIS		 Before	proceeding	with	the	analysis	of	the	Cox	proportional	hazards	regression,	it	is	useful	to	examine	the	United	Nations’	country-by-country	data	on	China’s	direct	foreign	investment	in	Latin	America.	It	should	be	noted	that	this	data	is	limited	in	both	its	timeframe	and	its	abundance.	It	extends	from	just	2001-2012,	and	several	Latin	American	countries	are	missing	years,	with	a	few	lacking	data	entirely.	Nevertheless,	the	data	is	useful	for	getting	a	general	sense	of	which	Latin	American	countries	are	the	primary	targets	of	Chinese	foreign	direct	investment.	The	countries	listed	in	Table	1	are	all	the	countries	that	had	at	least	one	year	of	reported	FDI	data.	Countries	that	hold	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China	are	labeled	with	an	asterisk.	
Table	1:	Country-by-Country	Sum	FDI	Inflows	from	China	(2001-2012)	
Country	 FDI	Inflows	(millions	of	US$)	Brazil	 1455	Venezuela	 729	Argentina*	 505	Panama*	 491	Ecuador*		 418	Mexico*	 252	Chile*	 97	
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Peru*	 	86	Colombia*	 53	Costa	Rica*	 21	Bolivia*	 13	Paraguay	 -11	*Holds	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China			 A	few	things	are	worth	of	attention	in	this	data.	Chiefly,	one	can	observe	that	the	majority	of	Latin	American	countries	receiving	FDI	inflows	from	China	have	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	in	effect.	However,	rather	surprisingly,	the	top	two	recipients	of	China’s	foreign	direct	investment	in	Latin	America,	Brazil	and	Venezuela,	do	not	hold	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	This	is	notable	because	it	contradicts	both	the	conventional	wisdom	and	empirical	evidence	surrounding	the	relationship	between	bilateral	investment	treaties	and	foreign	direct	investment.	If	bilateral	treaties	lead	to	greater	investment,	then	why	does	Bolivia,	a	country	that	received	just	$13	million	U.S.	dollars	from	China	over	this	eleven-year	span,	have	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	while	Brazil,	the	top	recipient	of	China’s	foreign	investment,	does	not?	One	way	to	approach	this	puzzle	is	to	examine	China’s	investment	in	Latin	American	countries	relative	to	their	GDP.	This	method	scales	Chinese	foreign	direct	investment	and	is	helpful	for	assessing	the	importance	of	Chinese	foreign	direct	investment	to	each	country.	Table	2	below	lists	the	FDI	inflows	of	China	from	2001-2012	as	a	percentage	of	each	Latin	American	country’s	2012	GDP.	
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Table	2:	Country-by-Country	Sum	FDI-GDP	Ratios	from	China	(2001-2012)	
Country	 Chinese	FDI	as	a	Percentage	of	Country’s	2012	GDP	Panama	 1.20%	Ecuador*		 .47%	Venezuela	 .20%	Argentina*	 .09%	Brazil	 .05%	Costa	Rica*	 .05%	Peru*	 .04%	Bolivia*	 .04%	Chile*	 .03%	Mexico*	 .02%	Colombia*	 .01%	Paraguay	 -.04%	*Holds	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China			 Introducing	a	country’s	GDP	into	the	equation	yields	a	few	changes.	China’s	foreign	direct	investment	in	relatively	small	economies,	such	as	those	of	Panama	and	Ecuador,	now	appears	more	significant.	Both	of	these	countries	possess	bilateral	investment	treaties	with	China,	perhaps	suggesting	that	the	treaties	could	play	a	significant	role	for	smaller,	less	developed	countries	that	presumably	have	less	access	to	the	international	investment	market.	Nevertheless,	there	are	still	results	that	merit	interest	and	further	examination.	For	example,	the	top	recipients	
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of	foreign	direct	investment	have	vastly	different	levels	of	natural	resource	wealth.	Resource-wealthy	countries	like	Ecuador	and	Venezuela	sit	atop	the	list	alongside	relatively	resource-poor	Panama.	The	impact	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	on	FDI	levels	also	remains	unclear.	Three	out	of	the	five	top	recipients	lack	a	bilateral	investment	treaty,	including	the	top	recipient,	Panama,	calling	their	importance	into	question.	Fortunately,	a	more	sophisticated	quantitative	analysis,	such	as	the	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	model,	can	offer	answers	to	some	of	these	remaining	questions.		 The	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	model	is	used	in	this	paper	to	examine	the	motivations	for	creating	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	in	greater	depth.	As	explained	in	the	methodology,	the	model	analyzes	the	various	independent	variables’	effect	on	the	likelihood	of	a	Latin	American	country	signing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	The	results	of	this	analysis	are	presented	below	in	Table	3.	
Table	3:		Cox	Proportional	Hazards	Coefficients	of	Likelihood	of	Signing	BIT	
with	China		 	Variables	 Coefficient	Estimate		 Standard	Error	 P>z		Left-Right	Ideological	Score		 -.750	 1.167	 .520	Natural	Resource	Wealth	 -.058	 .116	 .619	Oil	 -1.214	 1.133	 .284	Mineral	 .708	 .766	 .355	U.S.	BIT	 1.598	 .812	 .046**	*p-value<0.1;	**p-value<0.05;	***p-value<0.01		
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	 An	analysis	of	this	model	reveals	a	number	of	surprising	results.	First	and	most	importantly,	the	two	primary	theoretical	motivations	for	Chinese	investment,	left-wing	ideology	and	natural	resource	wealth,	are	not	associated	with	a	greater	likelihood	of	signing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty.	Neither	“Left-Right	Ideological	Score”	nor	“Natural	Resource	Wealth”	is	statistically	significant	in	affecting	the	likelihood	of	signing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty.	Likewise,	the	two	sub-variables	measuring	specific	natural	resources,	“Oil”	and	“Minerals,”	exhibit	no	statistically	significant	impact	on	the	likelihood	of	signing	a	treaty.	In	fact,	the	only	variable	that	exhibits	a	statistically	significant	effect	is	whether	a	Latin	American	country	possessed	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	the	United	States.	However,	although	the	“U.S.	BIT”	variable	is	statistically	significant,	it	is	correlated	in	the	opposite	of	my	hypothesized	direction.	Countries	possessing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	the	United	States	experience	an	increase	in	the	likelihood	of	signing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	This	would	seemingly	suggest	that	certain	countries	simply	prefer	to	sign	bilateral	investment	treaties	in	general,	while	other	countries	are	more	reticent	or	prefer	different	investment	strategies.			 There	are	two	discernible	explanations	for	this	rather	surprising	result.	The	first	would	be	that	the	two	principal	proposed	motivations	for	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America	do	not	significantly	impact	investment.	This	explanation	seems	extremely	unlikely.	As	demonstrated	in	this	paper’s	literature	review,	there	is	an	abundance	of	scholarly	research	that	indicates	these	two	factors	do	have	a	significant	impact	on	determining	the	amount	and	location	of	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America.	Empirical	studies	have	demonstrated	high	levels	of	Chinese	
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investment	in	natural	resource-rich	Latin	American	countries.	David	Dollar’s	research	has	shown	that	China	is	indifferent	to	quality	of	governance	when	investing	in	Latin	America,	strongly	suggesting	that	potential	political	alignments	play	a	role	in	its	investment	decisions.	In	short,	it	is	exceedingly	improbable	that	the	model	fundamentally	rebukes	the	proposed	motivations	for	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America.		 The	much	more	likely	second	explanation	for	the	model’s	results	is	that	bilateral	investment	treaties	are	not	accurate	predictors	of	increased	investment,	at	least	when	it	comes	to	the	Sino-Latin	America	economic	relationship.	This	finding,	while	slightly	less	shocking,	still	contradicts	the	established	scholarly	literature.	Eric	Neumayer	and	Laura	Spess’s	assertion	that	“developing	countries	that	sign	more	BITs	with	developed	countries	receive	more	FDI	inflows”	may	not	hold	true	for	the	China-Latin	America	relationship	(Neumayer	&	Spess	27).	In	fact,	the	results	from	the	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	analysis	are	more	aligned	with	the	earlier,	less	sophisticated	data	analysis	in	this	paper,	in	which	it	was	observed	that	several	of	China’s	top	FDI	recipients	have	not	signed	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.		If	it	is	true	that	bilateral	investment	treaties	are	not	important	tools	for	increasing	trade	and	investment	between	China	and	Latin	America,	then	a	few	fundamental	questions	remain:	Why	do	bilateral	investment	treaties	exist	in	the	Sino-Latin	America	economic	relationship?	Why	have	some	countries	signed	bilateral	investment	treaties	while	others	have	not?	What	purposes	could	these	treaties	serve?	
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		CHAPTER	6:	CASE	STUDIES	
Method	of	Qualitative	Analysis		 The	following	section	will	attempt	to	answer	the	questions	posed	at	the	end	of	the	last	chapter	through	detailed	qualitative	case	studies.	The	first	case	study	is	a	comparison	between	Brazil	and	Bolivia,	two	countries	with	similar	characteristics	(such	as	high	levels	of	natural	resources	and	strongly	left-leaning	governments)	that	have	different	outcomes	with	regards	to	their	economic	relationship	with	China.	This	case	study	will	explore	the	two	countries’	economic	relationship	with	China	in	depth	in	an	effort	to	account	for	these	differences.			 The	second	case	study	is	a	comparison	of	Ecuador	and	Colombia’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	with	China.	The	two	treaties	were	signed	within	a	two-year	timeframe	in	the	early	1990s	but	have	led	to	two	distinct	economic	relationships	with	China.	By	examining	the	two	countries’	bilateral	investment	treaties,	this	case	study	will	attempt	to	identify	difference	in	the	wording	and	structure	of	the	treaties	that	could	account	for	these	different	outcomes.		
Bolivia	and	Brazil-	Similar	Countries	with	Different	Results	What	makes	the	Latin	American	countries	Brazil	and	Bolivia	such	fascinating	subjects	of	analysis	and	comparison	is	that	they	share	similar	circumstances	and	characteristics	but	maintain	very	different	relationships	with	China.	In	terms	of	variables	identified	as	key	motivators	for	Chinese	foreign	investment	(i.e.	natural	resource	wealth	and	left-wing	governance),	Brazil	and	Bolivia	are	very	similar.	For	
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instance,	both	Brazil	and	Bolivia	are	rich	in	natural	resources,	albeit	in	different	sectors.	Brazil	is	the	largest	producer	of	oil	in	Latin	America,	while	Bolivia	is	one	of	the	region’s	top	mineral	exporters.	Furthermore,	both	countries	have	traditionally	been	led	by	left-wing	governments.	In	Bolivia,	Evo	Morales’	decade-long	tenure	as	President	has	maintained	a	stable	socialist	regime	with	the	potential	for	ideological	alignment	with	China.	In	Brazil,	government	control	has	swung	between	parties,	but	the	presidencies	of	Luiz	Lula	da	Silva	and	Dilma	Rousseff	were	both	periods	of	sustained	left-wing	government.		Because	of	these	similarities,	it	is	rather	surprising	that	Brazil	and	Bolivia’s	economic	relationships	with	China	are	quite	distinct.		Brazil	is	China’s	number	one	trade	partner	and	recipient	of	FDI,	cultivating	perhaps	the	strongest	relationship	with	China	of	any	country	in	Latin	America.	Despite	this,	Brazil	has	yet	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China.	Bolivia,	on	the	other	hand,	was	one	of	the	first	countries	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China	when	it	did	so	in	1992,	well	before	the	advent	of	the	Morales	regime.	Unfortunately,	this	treaty	has	not	led	to	much	investment	from	China.	Bolivia	is	one	of	the	lowest	recipients	of	Chinese	foreign	direct	investment,	receiving	just	$13	million	from	2001-2012	(United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development).		Of	course,	some	of	these	differences	in	investment	can	be	attributed	to	the	size	of	the	two	countries’	economies.	Brazil’s	GDP	per	capita	is	more	than	double	Bolivia’s,	and	Brazil’s	nominal	GDP	is	9th	in	the	world	whereas	Bolivia’s	is	97th	(World	Bank).	Additionally,	it	is	important	to	consider	that	foreign	direct	investment	can	fluctuate	considerably	year-to-year	depending	on	when	various	
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projects	start	and	end.	Nevertheless,	one	would	not	expect	two	countries	with	such	similar	significant	characteristics	to	have	such	a	massive	gap	in	investment.	For	context,	consider	the	previously	mentioned	$13	billion-dollar	foreign	direct	investment	by	China	in	Bolivia	from	2001-2012.	Over	that	same	time	period,	China	invested	more	than	1.4	trillion	dollars	in	Brazil,	or	more	than	100	times	as	much	(United	Nations	Conference	on	Trade	and	Development).	A	difference	that	large	indicates	a	far	greater	commitment	to	the	Brazil-China	economic	relationship	than	its	Bolivia-China	counterpart.	This	case	study	will	seek	to	evaluate	whether	this	difference	is	due	to	the	presence	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty,	nuances	in	relevant	factors	for	Chinese	investment,	or	something	else.	In	many	respects,	Bolivia’s	relationship	with	China	is	still	in	its	incipient	phase.	The	two	countries	celebrated	the	25th	anniversary	of	their	diplomatic	relations	in	2009,	but	for	much	of	that	time	period	the	relationship	was	merely	superficial.	Investment	in	Bolivia	until	around	2010	was	essentially	nonexistent,	and	research	has	demonstrated	that	Bolivian	individuals	still	do	not	demonstrate	much	interest	in	China.	With	that	said,	both	economic	and	political	relations	between	the	two	countries	have	accelerated	in	recent	years.	Since	2014,	China	has	made	two	massive	investment	deals	in	Bolivia,	one	a	$3.5	billion-dollar	investment	in	the	country’s	oil	industry	and	the	other	a	$450	million-dollar	mining	venture	(Avendano	et	al.	7).	However	perhaps	the	most	cogent	expression	of	the	growing	confidence	of	the	Sino-Bolivia	relationship	actually	comes	from	the	space	industry.	In	2013,	China	launched	a	$300	million-dollar	Bolivian	satellite.	The	satellite	was	co-financed	by	China’s	
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development	bank	and	Bolivia’s	government	and	is	the	first	communications	satellite	in	Bolivia’s	history	(Tiezzi).	The	impetus	for	the	increasingly	close	relationship	between	China	and	Bolivia	may	well	have	been	President	Evo	Morales.	His	far-left	government	(embodied	by	his	political	party	“Movement	Towards	Socialism”	or	“MAS”)	represents	a	fitting	ideological	partner	for	China’s	communist	party.	Tellingly,	Morales	recently	said	this	about	China:	“We	don't	feel	alone.	China's	presence	is	felt	in	the	cooperation	and	investments	that	the	Asian	country	carries	out	(in	Bolivia)”	(“Morales	Hails	China’s	Cooperation”).	This	language	used	by	Morales	suggests	a	growing	camaraderie	between	the	two	countries.	In	Brazil,	relations	with	China	are	both	deep	and	wide-ranging.		Their	diplomatic	ties	date	back	to	1974	when	both	countries	established	embassies	in	each	other’s	capitals.		As	a	result	of	this	relatively	early	linkage,	the	countries	have	entered	into	a	number	of	agreements	on	varying	subjects	including	trade	and	investment,	science	and	technology,	and	education	(Peters	14).	The	bond	strengthened	further	under	former	presidents	Luiz	Lula	da	Silva	and	Dilma	Rousseff,	both	of	whom	made	visits	to	China	during	their	terms	in	office.		The	burgeoning	relationship	was	so	successful	that	a	study	performed	by	the	Friedrich	Ebert	Foundation	labeled	China	as	“Brazil’s	most	promising	business	partner	and	strategic	ally”	(Barbosa	&	Mendes	2).		The	depth	of	the	relationship	has	led	to	a	mutual	trust	and	economic	interdependence.	Today	Brazil	is	the	supplier	of	more	than	40%	of	China’s	agricultural	goods,	making	Brazil	vital	for	China’s	food	security	(Horta	ii).	
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Meanwhile,	according	to	an	analysis	from	the	Atlantic	Council,	“The	world’s	largest	power	company,	the	state-owned	China	State	Grid	Corp.,	has	bet	the	house	on	the	Brazilian	electricity	market.	The	firm	has	invested	more	than	$7	billion	in	Brazil	since	2012”	(Avendano	et	al.	11).	Naturally,	the	significant	economic	engagement	between	the	two	countries	begs	the	question:	why	do	they	still	lack	a	bilateral	investment	treaty?	Perhaps	the	simplest	explanation	for	the	lack	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	between	China	and	Brazil	is	that	it	is	simply	unnecessary.		The	two	countries	are	already	engaging	in	unprecedented	levels	of	trade	and	investment,	and	the	time	and	transaction	costs	of	formulating	a	treaty	may	not	generate	a	significant	enough	payoff	to	be	worth	it.	However,	research	suggests	that	there	are	other	factors,	from	both	the	Chinese	and	Brazilian	perspectives,	which	contribute	to	the	lack	of	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	between	the	two	countries.		For	example,	Dr.	Kevin	Gallagher,	an	economist	and	expert	on	Chinese	trade	policy	in	Latin	America,	has	noted,	“Brazil…	is	very	concerned	about	some	of	the	measures	that	are	found	in	U.S.	style	bilateral	investment	treaties.”	Historically,	Brazil	has	been	averse	to	signing	bilateral	investment	treaties	due	to	a	strong	belief	among	politicians	that	“bilateral	investment	treaties	(are)	neither	necessary	nor	sufficient	for	attracting	FDI”	(Campello	&	Lemos	23).		In	contrast	to	Brazil,	Bolivia	signed	and	ratified	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China	in	the	early	1990s,	well	before	the	development	of	their	international	partnership.	While	the	simple	act	of	signing	may	have	been	a	formality	(Bolivia	signed	a	bevy	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	in	the	early	1990s),	it	has	become	
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clear	that	Bolivia	perceives	a	few	advantages	in	China’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	relative	to	those	of	the	U.S.	or	to	loans	from	the	I.M.F.	Most	importantly,	Bolivia	believes	the	aid	and	investment	from	China	comes	without	conditions	attached.	As	Morales	has	stated:	“If	we	accommodate	I.M.F	loans,	we	would	have	to	submit	to	privatization	policies	and	lose	our	national	heritage”	(“Morales	Hails	China’s	Cooperation”).	Here,	Morales	acknowledges	the	dominant	role	that	the	United	States	has	traditionally	played	in	Latin	American	politics	and	economies.	It	is	vital	not	to	ignore	the	role	of	the	United	States	in	the	both	the	Sino-Brazil	and	Sino-Bolivia	relationship.	Traditionally,	the	United	States	has	worked	to	ensure	a	leading	economic	and	political	role	in	much	of	Latin	America.	The	instruments	for	imposing	this	influence	have	often	been	various	intergovernmental	institutions	such	as	the	World	Trade	Organization	and	International	Monetary	Fund,	organizations	in	which	the	United	States	holds	an	outsized	influence	through	increased	voting	power.		So-called	“tied-aid”	forced	Latin	American	countries	to	privatize	and	open	their	economies	to	align	with	the	United	States’	capitalist	ideology	and	also	ensured	that	U.S.	exports	were	subsidized	and	given	certain	market	advantages	(Galeano).	If	Latin	American	countries	did	not	comply,	they	did	not	receive	the	aid.	Thus,	the	United	States	gained	a	hegemonic	influence	over	not	only	Brazil	and	Bolivia	but	also	the	entirety	of	Latin	America.		Today,	the	United	States	no	longer	maintains	the	level	of	control	over	Latin	America’s	economy	that	it	once	did,	but	its	influence	is	still	unmatched	in	the	region.		
	 	 	
	 32	
In	an	interesting	twist,	China’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	in	Latin	America	serve	as	a	sort	of	symbolic	rebuff	of	traditional	U.S.	hegemony.	As	we	will	see	in	the	following	analysis,	China’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	employ	certain	unique	features	that	hold	political	and	economic	importance.	
Ecuador	and	Colombia-	A	Tale	of	Two	BITs		 In	2014,	political	analyst	and	China	expert	Amos	Irwin	made	an	interesting	discovery	about	China’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	in	Latin	America.	He	noted	that	China	had	made	a	subtle	but	significant	change	to	the	response	mechanisms	of	its	bilateral	investment	treaties	beginning	in	1998.	Until	1998,	China’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	had	prohibited	foreign	investors	from	suing	their	host	governments	in	international	arbitration	tribunals.	However,	according	to	Irwin,	since	1998,	“China’s	treaty	negotiators	have	abandoned	this	restriction”	(Irwin	1).	This	change	is	important	because	the	ability	to	resolve	disputes	is	key	for	ensuring	treaty	compliance.	International	law	professor	Andre	Guzman	emphasizes	the	utility	of	dispute	resolution,	saying	it	“[increases]	the	incentive	toward	compliance	because	it	…	may	provide	for	some	formal	sanction”	(Guzman	585).	China’s	discontinuance	of	this	restriction	may	decrease	treaty	compliance.		 Irwin	proposes	several	different	arguments	for	this	shift	in	policy	from	China.	The	standard	theory	is	that	China	is	abandoning	this	restriction	as	part	of	a	general	economic	liberalization	policy	and	an	increasing	willingness	to	engage	in	dispute	resolution.	However,	Irwin	theorizes	that	China	is	in	fact	still	quite	reticent	to	grant	access	to	international	tribunals.	Instead	he	argues	that	allowing	access	in	Latin	American	countries	where	there	are	fewer	trade	disputes	and	less	money	at	risk	
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permits	China	to	“test	the	risks”	of	granting	these	tribunals	before	signing	treaties	with	European	countries	and	the	United	States	(Irwin	1).		 In	light	of	these	developments,	this	case	study	will	examine	the	bilateral	investment	treaties	of	two	Latin	American	countries:	Ecuador	and	Colombia.	Ecuador	signed	its	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China	in	1994,	while	Colombia	did	not	sign	one	until	2008.	This	time	difference	allows	for	examination	of	the	impact	of	the	international	tribunal	restriction,	as	Ecuador’s	pre-1998	treaty	contains	the	restriction	while	Colombia’s	post-1998	restriction	does	not.	In	addition,	the	examination	will	probe	for	other	distinctions	between	the	two	bilateral	investment	treaties	that	could	offer	clues	as	to	China’s	motivations	for	investment	in	Latin	America.		 Before	examining	the	differences	in	the	two	Latin	American	countries’	treaties,	it	is	useful	to	establish	an	idea	of	what	constitutes	a	successful	bilateral	investment	treaty.	The	goal	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	is	to	promote	investment,	and	they	accomplish	this	by	establishing	an	agreed-upon	set	of	terms	between	the	two	state	actors.	Incorporating	certain	measures	strengthens	bilateral	investment	treaties.	These	measures	include	clear	goals	and	requirements,	dispute	resolution,	and	response	mechanisms.	In	short,	“good”	bilateral	investment	treaties	promote	investment	by	establishing	a	clear	set	of	rules	as	well	as	punishments	for	those	who	break	the	rules.			 The	first	significant	distinction	between	Ecuador	and	Colombia’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	is	in	their	respective	obligations.	The	objectives	of	the	two	treaties	are	nearly	identical.	Both	treaties	aim	to	promote	foreign	direct	investment	
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by	China	in	the	two	countries.	However,	Colombia’s	treaty	includes	a	number	of	provisions	that	(theoretically	at	least)	should	enhance	the	likelihood	of	investment.		 The	most	striking	example	of	this	is	that	Colombia’s	treaty	includes	a	national	treatment	clause	while	Ecuador’s	does	not.	National	treatment	is	a	principle	that	prohibits	the	discrimination	of	foreign	goods	by	a	host	country.	In	essence,	countries	that	agree	to	national	treatment	must	treat	foreign	goods	exactly	like	domestic	goods.	According	to	the	Organization	for	Economic	Cooperation	and	Development,	“Clauses	on	national	treatment	are	part	of	the	standard	repertoire	of	bilateral	investment	treaties”	(“Making	the	Most	of	International	Investment	Agreements”).	Thus,	the	lack	of	a	national	treatment	clause	in	the	China-Ecuador	bilateral	investment	treaty	is	conspicuous.		However,	the	lack	of	a	national	treatment	clause	is	far	from	the	only	difference	in	the	two	countries’	bilateral	investment	treaties.	For	instance,	the	Colombian	treaty	makes	mention	of	health	and	environment	standards	with	regards	to	expropriation,	which	is	noticeably	absent	in	the	Ecuador	treaty.	In	short,	numerous	important	treaty	elements	incorporated	into	the	China-Colombia	treaty	are	nonexistent	in	the	China-Ecuador	treaty.		 There	are	a	few	different	possibilities	that	could	explain	the	absence	of	these	various	features.	One	possibility	could	simply	be	the	time	the	treaties	were	signed.	In	1994,	when	the	Ecuador	bilateral	investment	treaty	was	put	in	place,	national	treatment	may	not	have	been	a	universal	standard	(although	other	Chinese	bilateral	investment	treaties	of	the	same	era	contain	national	treatment	clauses).	Another	reason	could	be	that	Colombia’s	representatives	were	more	demanding	in	their	
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treaty	negotiations.	Colombia	has	traditionally	displayed	a	reticence	towards	bilateral	investment	treaties,	signing	just	two	prior	to	the	2000s.	In	contrast,	Ecuador	had	signed	more	than	twenty	treaties	prior	to	2000.	It	is	possible	that	Colombia	required	stricter	regulations	from	China	while	devising	the	treaty.		 While	the	differences	in	standards	of	treatment	in	the	Colombian	and	Ecuadorian	treaties	are	noteworthy,	the	most	significant	difference	is	in	the	two	treaties’	response	mechanisms.	The	China-Colombia	bilateral	investment	treaty	allows	for	disputes	to	be	settled	in	the	International	Center	for	Settlement	of	Investment	Disputes,	an	institution	associated	with	the	World	Bank.	The	China-Ecuador	treaty	only	allows	for	disputes	to	be	heard	in	the	domestic	courts	of	the	host	state.	On	paper,	this	is	a	vital	difference.	The	dispute	resolution	mechanisms	of	investment	treaties	are	what	give	them	teeth	by	prohibiting	cheating.	Guaranteeing	the	option	to	sue	in	front	of	an	impartial	international	arbiter	would	appear	to	give	the	Colombia-Ecuador	treaty	significantly	more	legitimacy	and	efficacy.		 However,	upon	closer	examination	this	distinction	may	not	be	as	vital	as	it	appears.	Colombia	has	only	lodged	one	complaint	in	an	international	investment	dispute,	against	Chile.	Of	course,	this	could	merely	indicate	that	China	and	other	countries	are	simply	abiding	by	the	terms	of	treaty.		Yet	the	lack	of	engagement	in	international	tribunals	means	that	China	assumes	very	little	risk	by	including	the	clause.	This	finding	would	appear	to	lend	weight	to	Irwin’s	contention	that	China’s	decision	to	allow	for	lawsuits	in	international	tribunals	in	the	Latin	American	treaties	may	be	motivated	by	a	desire	to	“test	the	waters”	before	agreeing	to	the	same	clause	with	European	nations.	Nevertheless,	there	could	be	unforeseen	
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consequences	of	China’s	policy	reversal.	In	2017,	Ecuador	publicized	its	desire	to	abandon	27	of	its	bilateral	investment	treaties,	including	the	one	with	China,	in	an	effort	to	negotiate	more	favorable	agreements	(Valencia).	It	is	possible	that	Ecuador	has	noticed	the	dispute	and	treatment	clauses	in	Colombia’s	and	other	Latin	American	countries’	bilateral	investment	treaties	with	China	and	now	wants	a	better	deal.		 Throughout	this	analysis,	it	appears	that	Colombia	possesses	a	superior	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	China	in	comparison	to	the	Ecuadorian	treaty.	Yet,	once	again,	the	levels	of	foreign	direct	investment	by	China	in	the	two	countries	challenge	the	notion	that	more	and	better	bilateral	investment	treaties	lead	to	greater	investment.	Ecuador,	the	holder	of	the	“lesser”	treaty,	received	more	than	$418	million	in	foreign	direct	investment	from	China	from	2001-2012,	more	than	seven	times	that	of	Colombia.	Colombia’s	superior	standards	of	treatment	and	enhanced	ability	to	sue	in	international	tribunals	have	not	resulted	in	high	levels	of	Chinese	investment.	In	short,	it	appears	as	though,	at	least	in	Latin	America,	the	relationship	between	robust	bilateral	investment	treaties	and	increased	investment	may	not	be	as	strong	as	has	been	previously	theorized.	
	 	
	 	 	
	 37	
		CHAPTER	7:	CONCLUSION	In	conclusion,	the	central	hypotheses	put	forth	at	the	beginning	of	this	study	regarding	the	motivations	for	China’s	and	Latin	America’s	signing	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	were	proven	incorrect	by	both	quantitative	and	qualitative	analyses.	The	Cox	Proportional	Hazards	model	demonstrated	that	China	was	not	more	likely	to	sign	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	with	a	left	wing	or	resource-rich	Latin	American	nation.	The	comparison	of	Brazil	and	Bolivia	revealed	that	China’s	signing	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	may	be	a	symbolic	gesture	of	diplomacy	rather	than	a	concrete	desire	for	investment,	as	Brazil	was	able	to	receive	large	sums	of	Chinese	investment	without	a	treaty	while	Bolivia’s	investment	levels	did	not	spike	until	a	decade	after	the	treaty	was	signed.	Finally,	the	comparison	of	Ecuador’s	and	Colombia’s	bilateral	investment	treaties	provided	insights	into	China’s	motivations	for	signing	the	bilateral	investment	treaties	and	suggested	that	the	treaties	may	not	be	as	important	as	previously	theorized.					 	It	is	important	to	note	that	the	scholarly	hypotheses	regarding	China’s	motivation	for	investment	in	Latin	America	are	not	contradicted	by	these	findings.	Due	to	the	unavailability	of	reliable	foreign	direct	investment	data,	both	the	quantitative	and	qualitative	analyses	focused	on	bilateral	investment	treaties,	rather	than	investment	itself.	Due	to	the	large	amount	of	credible	literature	on	this	subject,	it	is	quite	likely	that	China	is	motivated	to	invest	by	factors	such	as	resource	extraction	and	political	influence.	
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	 While	the	findings	in	this	paper	do	not	directly	contradict	the	general	causal	theory	regarding	the	factors	that	motivate	Chinese	investment	in	Latin	America,	they	do	offer	a	twist	to	the	conventional	narrative	regarding	bilateral	investment	treaties.	Large	deposits	of	rare	earth	minerals	and	radical	left-wing	governments	may	lead	to	greater	Chinese	investment,	but	they	do	not	appear	to	lead	to	Chinese	
investment	treaties.	This	finding	is	interesting	because	it	questions	the	efficacy	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	as	a	method	of	increasing	investment.	In	other	words,	if	signing	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	does	not	lead	to	higher	levels	of	investment,	then	what	is	the	point	of	doing	so?		 Of	course,	this	is	a	question	with	global	applicability.	Future	researchers	may	examine	the	efficacy	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	between	China	and	the	rest	of	the	world	(particularly	in	Africa,	where	Chinese	investment	has	spurred	similar	hypotheses	regarding	natural	resource	extraction).	It	would	also	be	worthwhile	to	analyze	whether	bilateral	investment	treaties	are	more	effective	in	certain	regions	of	the	world.	It	is	plausible	that	bilateral	investment	treaties	are	useful	tools	for	Western	nations	but	have	limited	usefulness	for	Asian,	African	and	Latin	American	countries.	In	short,	the	research	conducted	in	this	paper	offers	a	starting	point	for	greater	examination	of	bilateral	investment	treaties	and	their	role	in	shaping	the	future	global	economy.	
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APPENDIX	
Table	4:		Schoenfeld	Residuals	Tests		 	Variables	 Rho		 Chi2	 p-value		Left-Right	Ideological	Score		 -.311	 0.74	 .390	Natural	Resource	Wealth	 .573	 1.53	 .216	Oil	 .500	 2.37	 .124	Mineral	 .030	 0.01	 .925	U.S.	BIT	 .073	 0.05	 .832	*p-value<0.1;	**p-value<0.05;	***p-value<0.01	
	*A	p-value	below	.10	indicates	a	violation	in	the	proportionality	assumption.	Since	none	of	the	p-values	in	this	test	fell	below	.10,	the	proportionality	assumption	is	upheld.		
Graph	1:	Kaplan-Meier	Survival	Estimate	
	
	
	*This	descriptive	graph	displays	the	various	points	at	which	a	bilateral	investment	treaty	was	signed	between	China	and	a	Latin	American	country.	It	indicates	that	75%	of	the	Latin	American	countries	included	in	the	analysis	signed	an	investment	treaty,	with	the	majority	signing	in	the	first	20	years	since	China’s	economic	opening.	
